For a long time, I've been frustrated by spin movement (Magnus effect) charts because they don't genuinely show how much a pitch actually moves. These charts perfectly demonstrate how the spin of the ball changes its path, but they don't show how velocity adds a vertical element to the pitch's movement.
Take this chart for example. These are the pitches thrown by Texas Rangers LHP Derek Holland during September and October of last season.
Even though they are much slower pitches, Holland's change ups are located in the exact same place on the graph as his fastballs. If his fastball and change up start with the same trajectory, the change up will always cross the plate lower than the fastball. I wanted to capture this on a chart, so I put gravity back into the equation.
Using Gameday's physics data (initial position, initial velocity, acceleration), I calculated how long each pitch was in the air. Keep in mind, though, that PITCHf/x starts at 50 from the plate and ends just in front. The mapped data covers only about 48 1/2 feet.
With the flight time for each pitch, I calculated the drop caused by [sea-level] gravity. After converting this number from feet to inches, I added the vertical spin movement. Here's how it turned out:
Success. The change ups now appear below his fastballs. The chart reflects not only gravity's effect on a pitch, but it also helps separate pitches by velocity, making identification a little bit easier.
This chart does not replace virtualizations by any stretch of the imagination, but I think it does show how different two pitches can be from each other even when spin movement alone can't show it. Taking this a step further could lead to a "hitter's decision" chart that would represent how different the pitches look at a certain time or distance from the plate.
The gravity charts are now available for all pitchers in TexasLeaguers.com's PITCHf/x Database.
[[Update: On April 24, 2010, the Spin Movement w/Gravity charts were updated to reflect gravity's effect from y = 40 to y = 1.417. This change was made based on the information that can be found at Alan Nathan's PITCHf/x site: MLB Extended Gameday Pitch Logs: A Tutorial]]
If you're a betting man, you should know that the odds are good that this won't be my last article featuring the mechanics and health of the Texas Rangers starting pitcher Brandon McCarthy.
As my favorite subject, his mechanics have spent a lot of time on my computer monitor playing forward and backward, in slow motion, and in still shots. As a result, I have a small tendency to see a little bit of McCarthy in just about every pitcher. Every once in a while I run into a pitcher whose mechanics have a lot in common with him.
Meet University of Texas at Dallas junior Marvin Prestridge.
In light of recent mechanical changes, Prestridge doesn't look much like McCarthy does these days [Edit: this may not actually be true since I haven't seen high-speed video of McCarthy's new mechanics], but when I pulled up the video I shot of McCarthy last spring, the similarities were striking. The angles aren't quite the same, so you may have to use a little imagination in places.
They don't look too similar at the top of their leg kicks, but they appear to have a similar degree of reverse rotation (turning their backs to the plate). McCarthy is more compact, and Prestridge lifts his knee much higher.
At hand-break, their mechanics are starting to run together. McCarthy sits a little lower on his back leg. Prestridge breaks his hands much closer to his body.
Before foot plant, this is the frame where their elbows stop moving upward and backward (toward 1B), and their arms begin external rotation. You can clearly see McCarthy's inverted W and that Prestridge's arm is below shoulder level with an extended elbow. Both pitchers have their arms well behind their shoulders.
I much prefer Prestridge's method of picking up the baseball to McCarthy's method from last spring. As a part of the changes he has made to his mechanics over the past 9 months or so, McCarthy's current pick-up features a full arm swing that positions his pitching arm much like Prestridge's arm.
By the time they hit foot plant, there's only one evident difference between the two: Prestridge is pulling his glove arm back toward second base. McCarthy's glove arm is essentially dead weight, while Prestridge's arm helps create additional rotational force through his shoulders.
Again, the only difference is the glove arm action and position, though it appears that Prestridge has a greater degree of trunk tilt toward 1B.
At this point, the pitchers are literally inches away from letting go of the baseball. Prestridge is able to reach a little more toward vertical, thanks to his 1B-side trunk tilt.
After release, the pitching arm continues internal rotation while the body tries to keep the arm from flying out of socket. This frame attempts to capture the moment where internal rotation stops.
What's clear in this frame is that McCarthy's arm continued to fly forward, winding up closer to his head than to his chest. Prestridge's arm, on the other hand, is still essentially at shoulder level. This is the most significant difference between the two deliveries.
With McCarthy's arm positioned like this, the head of his humerus is placed in an anatomically questionable position while his rotator cuff applies extreme compressive force at the glenohumeral joint, driving the humerus awkwardly into the scapula.
Prestridge's arm is in a more natural position at this point, and as a result, I do not view his mechanics as risky despite their on-the-surface similarity to McCarthy's old, problematic mechanics.
The Texas Rangers won 87 games in 2009, and the 2009 attendance numbers for Major League Baseball were compiled by Maury Brown in early October.
The model I prepared says that 87 wins should be worth an average attendance of 27,958. According to the data gathered and prepared for the Brown article, the average attendance of Texas Rangers home games in 2009 was 27,641. A difference of only 317 attendees per game translates to an overshot of only +1.15%.
As much as I would like to pat myself on the back for this, I have to acknowledge the extreme amount of luck involved with the startling accuracy of my prediction.
My model came with a sizable standard error attached to it: 2,646 attendees per game. You don't need to be a statistician to recognize how large that is or the uncertainty that it projects. I addressed this briefly in the comments of the original article:
The line in the graph marks the raw estimate based on the information provided by the model. At any given point on the line, the standard error says that the attendance level could be 2,646 higher or lower than the line.
With the reason for the 2008 drop off in question, it is probably unreasonable to expect that attendance will simply rebound to the 2006 or 2007 level. For this reason, I expect that actual attendance will fall somewhere below the line but within 2,646 attendees per game.
The luck of this season will definitely narrow the standard error of the 2010 model. Look for the 2010 model some time in February as the new season approaches.
Kenny Rogers (2001). Hank Blalock (2007). John Rheinecker (2008). Matt Harrison (2009). Jarrod Saltalamacchia (2009). These are the five major leaguers from the Texas Rangers who have been diagnosed with thoracic outlet syndrome in recent history.
Aaron Cook (2004). Kip Wells (2006). Jeremy Bonderman (2008). Noah Lowry (2009). These are the four major leaguers from all other teams who have been diagnosed with thoracic outlet syndrome in recent history. [Note: There may be more, but there aren't many. This is all I could find.]
Texas Rangers 5, Everyone Else 4. The Texas Rangers also had a minor leaguer diagnosed with thoracic outlet syndrome - pitcher John Hudgins (2005).
The definition of an epidemic, according to Wikipedia, is "when new cases of a certain disease, in a given human population, and during a given period, substantially exceed what is 'expected,' based on recent experience."
Recent experience tells us that roughly 10 players have been diagnosed with TOS in the past 9 years. More than half of those players belong(ed) to a very specific population: the Texas Rangers.
Thoracic outlet syndrome (TOS) is fairly common in overhead athletes like swimmers and baseball players. The overhead movement of the arm changes the orientation of the clavicle (collar bone) in such a manner that it may compress the brachial plexus (the nerve bundle the leads into the arm from the neck) and/or the subclavian artery and vein against the first rib.
The compression usually leads to numbness or pain in the affected arm, but it can also lead to blood clots like it did with Aaron Cook in 2004.
Undiagnosed TOS can have very serious health implications. In Cook's case, a clot broke away from the compression site in his shoulder and traveled to his lungs resulting in a pulmonary embolism.
Diagnosis is clearly very important when it comes to TOS. The Texas Rangers, however, have experienced quite a large number of TOS cases in recent years. Here's a brief look at a few reasons why this may be the case.
Access to expert opinion
Dr. Gregory Pearl, of Texas Vascular Associates, is a well-respected vascular surgeon who happens to live in the Metroplex. Dr. Pearl was involved with the TOS cases for Rogers, Blalock, Harrison, and Saltalamacchia - and likely Hudgins and Rheinecker as well. This relationship history and his proximity to the ballclub makes it far easier for Texas Rangers to be diagnosed with TOS.
Kenny Rogers provided the club with a first-hand example of what TOS can do to a pitcher's performance. When Rogers returned with an extra 4-5 mph on his fastball, Dr. Pearl was probably put on speed dial.
Pitchers are a high risk group for TOS compared to position players because of the quantity and intensity of their throws but also because of the way they turn their heads toward the plate. With the previous image in mind, take a look at Matt Harrison.
When the head and neck turn away from the compression site, the brachial plexus and subclavian blood vessels are pulled into the narrowing gap between the rib and clavicle.
For low intensity throws where the head doesn't turn, TOS is less of a concern.
Of particular note are position players Hank Blalock and Jarrod Saltamacchia, each of whom had TOS in his throwing shoulder. To discount their mechanics entirely would be foolish, but I found no reports of TOS diagnosis in any other position player. This suggests, perhaps incorrectly, that something behind the scenes has made a significant contribution.
Weight lifting can produce stress far in excess of what an intense throw can produce, but it's practically impossible to properly perform any exercise and cause thoracic outlet compression at the same time. When bad form enters the equation, though, all bets are off.
Dynamic exercises may contribute an intertial element in a manner similar to that of throwing a baseball. Even these, when performed properly, aren't likely to be significant contributors. As with weight lifting, if they are not performed correctly, they become a risk for TOS and a number of other potential problems.
If training is to blame, it's likely a series of exercises rather than a single one that results in thoracic outlet compression.
Blind, stinking luck
Not to be overlooked is random chance. It is entirely possible that the Texas Rangers have simply been unlucky. It is possible that each affected player was genetically at risk for TOS and would have been diagnosed no matter what team he was playing for. It may be nothing more than luck that has brought these players to Arlington.
So which is it?
In truth, it's most likely a combination of these factors. Given the current state of exercise science, training methods are probably the least likely to blame.
Throwing mechanics and luck combined with having a "resident" expert have likely been equally responsible for the Rangers' having lapped the rest of Major Leage baseball in thoracic outlet syndrome diagnoses.
[Historical TOS Note: David Cone and J.R. Richard, both pitchers, were also known/beleived to have suffered from thoracic outlet syndrome, but both diagnoses were well before the "Dr. Pearl era."]
Author Mark Hyman of The New York Times recently published an article about two studies that have shown curveballs are no more stressful on the arm than fastballs. Hyman uses this information to openly question the wisdom that says curveballs are bad for young arms. [Click here to read Hyman's article in full.]
The chief problem with Hyman's article is that he seems to misinterpret the study's conclusion. The study found no link between curveballs and injuries, but Hyman appears to have interpreted this to mean that curveballs conclusively do not lead to injury. This is a logical fallacy.
It's unclear whether Hyman has an opinion of his own, but he did seek the opinions of Dr. Glenn Fleisig and Dr. James Andrews. He offers these opposing quotes from Dr. Fleisig and Dr. Andrews about the studies.
I don't think throwing curveballs at any age is the factor that is going to lead to an injury.
Dr. Fleisig's quotes in the article clearly indicate that he doesn't believe throwing a curveball is any worse than throwing fastballs or change-ups. They may be taken out of context, but Hyman sure makes it seem like Dr. Fleisig is very confident with this position.
It may do more harm than good -- quote me on that.
Dr. Andrews, on the other hand, seems to have a deeper understanding of what the studies actually reveal. While the studies did not reveal an obvious link between curveballs and injuries, Dr. Andrews recognizes that a link may still exist outside the scope of these studies.
Obviously, a more stressful pitch is more risky than a less stressful pitch. That's just not all there is to it.
The two recent studies were inspired by a study published in 2006 by Dr. Fleisig, Dr. Andrews, et al. That study's clinical relevance was summed up in its abstract:
Because the resultant joint loads were similar between the fastball and curveball, this study did not indicate that either pitch was more stressful or potentially dangerous for a collegiate pitcher. The low kinetics in the change-up implies that it is the safest.
Essentially, this means that the slower your arm moves, the safer the pitch. This principle carried over into the follow-up studies on youth pitchers, and it's the main flaw with all three.
The studies measure raw joint torques but they don't account for basic mechanical or functional differences between the pitches which already vary from pitcher to pitcher anyway.
The key factor that is essentially unaccounted for in these studies is forearm action - pronation versus supination. A properly pronated pitch is not equivalent to a supinated pitch no matter how similar the kinetic measurements may be.
The muscles of the flexor-pronator mass can provide support against the valgus force that damages the ulnar collateral ligament (UCL). When a pitch is thrown with the forearm in a supinated position throughout the delivery - as most pitchers throw their curveballs - these muscles do not provide the same support for the UCL. This makes UCL tears more likely even if there is no difference in the measured stress levels between pitches.
Additionally, powerful pronation through release helps decelerate elbow extension and helps prevent the olecranon process from slamming into the olecranon fossa on the back of the elbow. When the elbow slams closed it can lead to inflammation of the hyaline cartilage and excessive bone growth including lengthening of the ulna, bone spurs, and bone chips.
When a supinated curveball is thrown, a pitcher risks injury in a number of ways. Without paying attention to what the pitcher is actually doing with his body, these studies simply do not reveal much. They certainly don't give carte blanche to start flipping curveballs like they're going out of style.